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MAIN POINTS
•	 Over	 the	past	 twelve	months	Bulgaria,	 the	Czech	Republic	 and	Romania	
have	made	 a	U-turn	 in	 their	 approach	 to	 shale	 gas	 exploration	 and	pro-
duction.	Until	the	end	of	2011,	the	governments	of	these	countries	showed	
a	positive	(Bulgaria)	or	neutral	(Romania,	the	Czech	Republic)	attitude	both	
to	prospecting	for	domestic	deposits	and	the	potential	production	of	shale	
gas,	which	resulted	in	licenses	being	granted	to	companies	specialising	in	
the	field.	(Compared	to	Poland,	however,	the	number	of	licences	awarded	in	
these	three	countries	was	negligible.	Romania	issued	most	but	even	there	
the	total	number	did	not	exceed	ten).	A wave of criticism from local so-
ciety and environmentalists – often backed by interest groups – con-
tributed to a shift in the position the countries’ governments took on 
the issue. In	 early	 January	 2012,	Bulgaria	 introduced	 a	 complete	ban	on	
shale	 gas	prospecting	 and	production,	while	 the	new	Romanian	govern-
ment	announced	a	moratorium	on	all	prospecting	work	in	May	and	plans	to	
extend	it	for	a	period	of	two	years	if	it	wins	the	December	election.	A	simi-
lar	moratorium	is	currently	being	prepared	also	by	the	Czech	government.	
•	 The	 sudden	 change	 of	 tack	 observed	 in	 the	 three	 countries	 stems	 from	
a	combination	of	a	number	of	socioeconomic	and	political	conditions,	 in-
cluding	widespread	fears	over	the	potential	environmental	impact	of	hy-
draulic	fracturing	used	in	shale	gas	prospecting	and	extraction.	The gro-
wing distrust within society, based on real concerns expressed by 
local communities, has given impetus to highly effective campaigns 
launched by local environmentalists (whose	activism	is	relatively	well-
-established	in	the	three	countries).	The change in attitude was also af-
fected by the lack of information both about the benefits and the po-
tential risks of shale gas production. None	of	the	countries	has	reliable	
estimates	of	the	amount	of	shale	gas	they	could	extract	at	its	disposal.	This	
in	turn	makes	it	 impossible	to	estimate	the	potential	profit	the	countries	
could	generate	by	tapping	into	their	deposits.	It	should	also	be	noted	that	
the	suspension	of	prospecting	work	was	partly	linked	to	the	lack	of	local	
regulations	that	could	address	the	specificity	of	shale	gas	production.	
•	 The	shift	 in	 the	government’s	position	was	also	 influenced	by	 their	poli-
tical	 situation.	 In all three countries, parts of the political class saw 
the growing public concern over the production of shale gas as an ef-
fective tool for the consolidation and mobilisation of the electorate, 
or even as an asset in on-going political battles with their opponents. 
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Meanwhile,	the	discussions	about	the	benefits	of	the	project,	particularly	
with	regard	to	the	energy	security	of	the	countries	concerned,	proved	inef-
fective.	The	dynamics	of	the	debate	on	shale	gas	have	been	further	affected	
by	the	fact	that	it	coincides	with	election	campaigns	in	all	three	countries.	
•	 The foreign companies interested in the production of shale gas have 
failed to establish united and effective interest groups.	The	companies	
did	 not	 launch	media	 campaigns	 capable	 of	 counterbalancing	 the	 objec-
tions	 raised	 by	 the	 environmentalists,	 and	 their	 actions	 did	 not	 suggest	
that	 their	presence	 in	these	countries	was	of	strategic	 importance	to	the	
companies.	In	addition,	little	interest	in	the	matter	was	shown	by	local	pro-
duction	companies.	
•	 The	governments	in	Bucharest,	Sofia	and	Prague	have	opted	to	wait	out	the	
period	of	uncertainty	and	it	appears	that	in	the	medium	term	they	are	like-
ly	to	use	their	influence	to	both	formally	and	informally	stall	the	prospec-
ting	and	potential	production	of	shale	gas.	This	does	not,	however,	rule	out	
the	possibility	of	 future	 exploration	and	production.	One of the factors 
which could lead to the review of this approach could be the potential 
success of the shale gas industry in Poland. What happens in Poland is 
particularly significant since the on-going discussions about shale gas 
in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have been making repe-
ated references to the decisions taken by the government in Warsaw. 
•	 The	complete	abandonment	of	plans	to	prospect	for	shale	gas	in	Bulgaria,	
the	Czech	Republic	and	Romania	would	mean	the	abandonment	of	an	op-
portunity	to	increase	the	diversification	of	gas	supplies	and	thus	also	the	
possibility	to	reduce	these	countries’	dependence	on	Russia.	If	local	depo-
sits	could	yield	industrial	amounts	of	shale	gas,	the	need	for	the	Russian	
gas	would	be	reduced,	which	would	be	particularly	significant	for	Bulgaria	
(Romania	has	large	deposits	of	conventional	gas,	while	the	Czech	Republic	
imports	a	third	of	 its	gas	from	Norway).	This	 is	 likely	to	be	the	main	re-
ason	why	politicians and businessmen with a vested interest in closer 
cooperation with Russia have been engaged in criticism of the plans 
for local shale gas production (such opposition has been particularly 
visible in Bulgaria, but less so in the Czech Republic and Romania). It 
is likely that these actors have been making other, informal, efforts to 
influence the debate in all three countries. 
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•	 Nonetheless, the	apparent	reticence	of	the	relevant	authorities	to	go	ahead	
with	shale	gas	projects	is	no	indicator	that	the	governments	in	these	three	
countries	are	ignoring	the	need	to	diversify	gas	supplies	with	a	view	to	im-
proving	their	energy	security.	Bulgaria,	the	Czech	Republic	and	Romania	
have	been	actively	expanding	 their	 cross-border	gas	 transmission	 infra-
structure,	and	have	not	abandoned	their	efforts	to	 look	for	 local	deposits	
of	conventional	gas,	or	to	secure	energy	resources	other	than	gas.	Bulgaria	
and	Romania,	for	instance,	have	been	inviting	investors	interested	in	pro-
specting	for	hydrocarbon	resources	 in	the	Black	Sea;	and	all	 three	coun-
tries	have	been	running	their	own	nuclear	programmes.	Taking	all	of	the	
above	 into	 consideration,	 the accusations that the respective govern-
ments have been taking decisions favourable to the Russian state, or 
have ignored the opportunity to improve their countries’ energy se-
curity, are rather isolated and are expected to have little impact on 
the on-going public debate on the matter. 
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I. BULGARIA
1. Production potential – deposits and corporate interest in shale gas
To	date,	no	large-scale	tests	have	been	conducted	to	estimate	the	size	of	the	
country’s	 shale	 gas	 deposits.	 Prior	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 ban,	 the	Bul-
garian	Economy	and	Energy	Minister	suggested	that	 the	size	of	 the	depos-
its	ranged	between	300	bcm	and	1	tcm.	The	minister	did	not,	however,	cite	
any	official	reports	to	back	up	his	estimates.	So	far,	similar	figures	have	been	
proposed	only	by	the	US	Energy	Information	Administration	(EIA).	The	EIA	
estimates	that	the	total	accessible	shale	gas	deposits	spread	across	Bulgaria,	
Romania	and	Hungary	amount	to	around	538	bcm.	At	the	moment,	the	only	
company	 confirming	 the	presence	 of	 shale	 gas	 in	Bulgaria	 is	Direct	 Petro-
leum	(DP).	In	September	2010,	DP	reported	that	according	to	its	initial	esti-
mates,	around	300	bcm	of	shale	gas	is	available	in	the	area	covered	under	the	
Lovech	licence.	
An	 exact	 estimate	 of	 the	 Bulgarian	 shale	 gas	 deposits	 is	 currently	 impossi-
ble,	since	in	early	2012	the	government	imposed	a	complete	ban	on	the	use	of	
hydraulic	fracturing	-	a	method	used	both	in	prospecting	and	extraction.	Re-
search	institutes	are	still	permitted	to	carry	out	tests	aimed	at	estimating	the	
size	of	 the	deposits	but	only	on	the	condition	that	 they	do	not	use	hydraulic	
fracturing	and	do	not	use	their	findings	for	commercial	purposes.	
In	 practice,	 therefore,	 further	 tests	 can	 be	 conducted	 only	 using	 geological	
analyses	(i.e.	rock	testing).	
Prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	ban,	over	a	dozen	companies	expressed	interest	
in	prospecting	for	unconventional	gas	deposits	in	Bulgaria.	The	most	important	
of	them	was	US	energy	giant	Chevron,	which	in	June	2011	won	a	bid	to	search	
for	shale	gas	at	the	Novi	Pazar	field	(the	final	licence	agreement,	however,	was	
never	signed).	Other	energy	players	interested	in	the	project	included	Canada’s	
Park	Place	Energy	and	the	above	mentioned	Direct	Petroleum,	both	of	whom	
hold	prospecting	licences	in	Bulgaria	(see	Table,	p.	27).	Local	environmental-
ists	have	also	speculated	that	among	the	companies	prospecting	for	Bulgarian	
shale	gas	was	Rosgeocom	(linked	to	the	Russo-Bulgarian	Overgas),	which	holds	
a	licence	for	operations	near	the	village	of	Rogozina	in	north-eastern	Bulgaria.	
This	area,	however,	borders	on	the	Novi	Pazar	field,	which	had	been	secured	
under	a	separate	licence	by	Chevron.	To	date,	Bulgaria’s	state	gas	company	Bul-
gargaz	has	expressed	no	interest	in	searching	for	shale	gas.	
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	A	discovery	of	substantial	deposits	of	shale	gas	in	Bulgaria	and	the	subsequent	
large-scale	production	of	 the	gas	would	doubtless	 improve	 the	country’s	en-
ergy	security.	Although	natural	gas	accounted	for	just	12%	of	energy	resources	
used	by	Bulgaria	in	2011,	the	country	is	dependent	almost	entirely	on	imported	
gas.	Domestic	gas	production	meets	no	more	 than	 15%	of	Bulgaria’s	gas	 con-
sumption,	while	the	rest	of	the	demand	is	met	by	importing	gas	from	Russia.	
2. Legal status – the ban on hydraulic fracturing  
and its modification
Prior	 to	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 ban	 on	 the	 use	 of	 hydraulic	 fracturing,	 the	
Bulgarian	 companies	 interested	 in	 searching	 for	 shale	 gas	 operated	 under	
a	legal	framework	regulating	traditional	activities	involved	in	the	prospecting	
and	extraction	of	hydrocarbons.	This	changed	with	the	introduction	of	a	ban	
adopted	by	Bulgaria’s	parliament	on	 18	 January	2012	which	prohibits	 all	use	
of	hydraulic	fracturing.	The	new	regulations	are	to	remain	in	place	until	fur-
ther	notice	and	any	violation	of	 the	ban	could	 lead	 to	 the	 loss	of	 the	 licence	
and	a	fine.	All	companies	prospecting	for	gas	or	oil	were	given	three	months	
to	submit	a	declaration	of	the	prospecting	and	extraction	methods	to	the	local	
directorate	of	geology.	
The	 introduction	of	 the	ban	resulted	 in	significant	confusion	within	 the	ex-
tractive	 industry.	 In	 February	 2012,	 the	 Bulgarian	Ministry	 of	 Energy	 and	
Economy	reported	that	the	framing	of	the	ban	effectively	prevents	the	extrac-
tion	of	conventional	gas	from	deep	deposits,	as	well	as	making	it	illegal	to	use	
the	country’s	sole	gas	storage	facility	at	Chiren	(where	gas	was	pumped	at	high	
pressure).	Consequently,	 the	 government	 set	up	 a	 temporary	parliamentary	
committee	tasked	with	amending	the	ban	to	ensure	that	the	production	of	con-
ventional	gas	would	not	be	affected	and	that	the	Chiren	storage	facility	could	
stay	open.	The	changes	were	approved	by	Parliament	in	mid	June.	The	original	
clause,	setting	an	upper	limit	of	20	atmospheres	on	the	injection	of	chemical	
substances	underground,	was	removed.	The	amended	document	did	however	
retain	a	complete	ban	on	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	and	all	other	technolo-
gies	which	break	up	rocks	to	extract	gas	or	oil.	
The	ban	approved	by	Parliament	was	however	only	a	 resolution	 (‘reshenie’),	
rather	 than	 a	 statutory	 decision.	 This	means	 that	 the	 restrictions	 could	 be	
changed	or	withdrawn	relatively	quickly.	The	legal	framing	used	by	Parliament	
came	under	 criticism	 from	 the	 opponents	 of	 shale	 gas	production,	who	had	
been	calling	for	a	statutory	ban.	So	far,	Boyko	Borisov’s	Cabinet	has	refused	to	
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meet	this	demand,	claiming	that	the	current	regulations	are	sufficient.	None-
theless,	the	possibility	of	future	changes	cannot	be	ruled	out.	In	April	2012,	the	
government	set	up	a	temporary	Prospecting	and	Extraction	Committee.	The	
committee	drew	up	the	required	changes	to	the	January	draft	but,	although	it	
fulfilled	its	objective,	it	was	not	disbanded	(in	June	its	mandate	was	extended	
for	another	three	months).	
3. The shale gas debate 
Public	debate	about	the	extraction	of	shale	gas	in	Bulgaria	began	in	earnest	in	
June	2011	when	US	energy	giant	Chevron	won	its	bid	to	undertake	prospect-
ing	activities	at	the	Novi	Pazar	field.	The	fact	that	the	licence	was	given	to	one	
of	the	best-known	energy	companies,	for	which	it	was	willing	to	pay	a	record	
US$	30	million,	brought	the	issue	to	public	attention.	The	risks	associated	with	
the	extraction	of	shale	gas	became	one	of	the	most	frequently	discussed	topics	
in	the	press,	on	television	and	above	all	on	the	Internet.	Local	media	reported	
widely	on	the	work	done	in	this	area	in	other	countries	but	most	reports	fo-
cused	on	the	negative	aspects	of	the	projects	(including	earthquakes	in	the	vi-
cinity	of	shale	gas	extraction	operations,	or	the	corruption	scandal	surround-
ing	the	granting	of	licences	in	Poland).	
This	led	to	the	formation	of	two	camps	–	the	supporters	and	the	opponents	of	
shale	gas	production.	Until	the	very	last	minute,	the	supporters of the project	
included	Bulgaria’s	minority	government	formed	by	the	Citizens	for	European	
Development	of	Bulgaria	(GERB).	Traicho	Traikov,	the	country’s	Economy	and	
Energy	Minister,	was	highly	vocal	 in	the	public	debate	on	shale	gas	produc-
tion,	while	Prime	Minister	Boyko	Borisov	tried	to	avoid	public	declarations	on	
the	matter.	Support	for	the	project	was	offered	also	by	the	right-wing	Blue	Coa-
lition	–	a	small	political	circle	of	a	former	anti-Communist	movement,	as	well	
as	a	group	of	scientists	and	energy	experts.	Among	the	best	known	of	 them	
were	geology	professor	Kristalina	Stoykova	from	the	State	Geological	Institute,	
and	energy	expert	Ilian	Vasilev,	the	former	Bulgarian	ambassador	to	Moscow.	
The	US	embassy	in	Sofia	also	played	an	important	role	in	the	debate;	Ambas-
sador	James	Warlick	made	frequent	comments	to	the	media	highlighting	the	
benefits	of	shale	gas	production.	What	was	striking,	however,	was	the	fact	that	
the	public	debate	was	not	 joined	by	representatives	of	 the	companies	which	
had	been	engaged	in	prospecting	for	shale	gas	in	Bulgaria.	
The	supporters	of	the	project	stressed	that	shale	gas	could	play	a	central	role	in	
increasing	the	country’s	energy	security	and	would	strengthen	the	Bulgarian	
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economy.	Energy	and	Economy	Minister	Traicho	Traikov	suggested	that	any	
future	production	of	shale	gas	in	the	country	would	translate	into	lower	gas	
prices,	a	diversification	of	supply	sources,	new	jobs,	and	would	generate	addi-
tional	corporate	tax	revenue	for	the	state.	The	actions	taken	by	the	government	
focused	exclusively	on	highlighting	 the	positive	 impact	of	 shale	gas	produc-
tion	in	the	country,	and	eschewed	the	most	controversial	issues	which	gener-
ate	public	concern	–	namely,	the	potential	environmental	risks	of	the	project.	
The	ineffectiveness	of	the	government’s	information	policy	was	exemplified	by	
the	lack	of	public	consultation	on	the	matter,	and	the	fact	that	the	only	parlia-
mentary	debate	on	shale	gas	production	ever	held	in	Bulgaria’s	Parliament	took	
place	on	the	eve	of	the	introduction	of	the	ban.	Experts	remained	divided	on	
the	issue	but	most	agreed	that	the	government	should	first	measure	the	size	of	
the	Bulgarian	deposits.	
In	contrast	to	the	campaign	launched	by	the	government	and	the	energy	com-
panies,	the	opponents of shale gas production	in	Bulgaria	organised	a	highly	
dynamic,	professional	and	innovative	campaign.	This	camp	consisted	of	doz-
ens	of	organisations	and	environmental	groups,	as	well	as	nearly	all	opposition	
political	parties	 (with	 the	exception	of	 the	Blue	Coalition).	 Initially,	 the	 lead	
was	taken	by	environmentalists,	who	set	up	the	‘Civil	Initiative	for	the	ban	on	
the	prospecting	and	extraction	of	shale	gas	using	hydrofracking	across	Bul-
garia’.	The	new	group	helped	organise	demonstrations	across	the	country	and	
coordinated	the	collection	of	signatures	under	a	proposal	for	a	statutory	ban	on	
hydraulic	fracturing	(collecting	over	50,000	signatures).	At	the	peak	of	public	
interest	in	the	issue	–	in	January	2012	–	street	protests	were	attended	by	over	
10,000	people	in	20	cities	across	the	country.	The	demonstrators	used	catchy	
slogans	and	professionally	produced	banners	and	placards,	which	stressed	the	
risk	of	drinking	water	being	polluted	and	potential	earthquakes.	The	group’s	
leaders	–	Borislav	Sandov	and	Mariana	Hristova	–	made	frequent	appearances	
in	the	local	media.	In	addition,	the	opponents	of	shale	gas	were	very	active	also	
online.	They	set	up	a	number	of	websites	(including	http://www.zonabg.com,	
http://shalegas-bg.eu)	 and	were	present	on	various	 social	network	web	por-
tals.	Their	message	focuses	on	the	risk	of	an	environmental	disaster	and	points	
out	the	ineffectiveness	of	Bulgarian	environmental	protection	procedures.	The	
activists	also	launched	scathing	attacks	on	local	scientists	who	supported	the	
plans	for	shale	gas	extraction,	and	suggested	that	the	individuals	had	links	to	
US	business	circles	and	the	secret	service.	
The	opponents	were	soon	joined	by	representatives	of	political	parties,	particu-
larly	the	post-Communist	Bulgarian	Socialist	Party	(BSP).	The	party’s	presidential	
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candidate	in	last	October’s	election,	Ivaylo	Kalfin	(who	lost	to	the	GERB	candi-
date),	turned	opposition	to	shale	gas	production	into	one	of	his	main	campaign	
themes.	BSP	MPs	also	helped	organise	 the	 early	 stages	of	public	protests	 and	
drew	up	a	bill	which	would	introduce	a	statutory	ban	on	hydraulic	fracturing.	
They	repeatedly	stressed	that	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	could	endanger	the	
lives	of	the	local	people	and	could	have	a	devastating	impact	on	the	environment.	
It	was	also	suggested	that	this	new	technology	would	be	developed	at	the	ex-
pense	of	nuclear	energy	projects,	which	BSP	continues	to	support.	Those	poli-
ticians	who	have	been	most	actively	involved	in	the	anti-shale	gas	campaign	
are	often	seen	as	representing	the	interests	of	Bulgaria’s	nuclear lobby,	and	
are	therefore	believed	to	favour	closer	energy	links	with	Russia.	Among	them	
are	Energy	Ministers	in	the	BSP	government	Rumen	Ovcharov	and	Petar	Dim-
itrov,	as	well	as	BSP	MP	Petko	Korumbashev.	The	public	debate	also	raised	the	
issue	of	how	to	protect	Bulgaria’s	national	 interest	and	how	to	prevent	 local	
energy	resources	being	exploited	by	foreign	companies.	This	rhetoric	was	used	
mainly	 by	 the	 xenophobic	Ataka	 (Attack)	 party,	whose	 leader	 is	 known	 for	
making	frequent	anti-American	statements.	
Apart	from	the	politicians	and	environmentalists,	highly	sceptical	comments	
about	 shale	 gas	 production	 have	 been	 coming	 also	 from	 Bulgaria’s	 well-de-
veloped	nuclear	 industry.	Bogomil	Manchev,	 the	 chairman	of	 the	Bulgarian	
Atomic	Forum	and	an	authority	on	nuclear	energy,	stressed	that	shale	gas	in	
Bulgaria	was	nothing	more	than	a	political	project	which	posed	a	real	threat	
to	the	local	environment.	His	company	Risk	Engineering,	which	operates	in-
ternationally,	was	involved	in	the	implementation	of	the	Russo-Bulgarian	NPP	
project	in	Belene.	GERB	abandoned	plans	for	the	plant	in	March	2012	but	Bu-
latom,	with	very	strong	support	from	BSP,	has	recently	launched	a	campaign	
aimed	at	reviving	the	project.	
Sustained	pressure	from	environmental	groups	and	from	the	majority	of	the	
Bulgarian	political	scene,	coupled	with	growing	public	opposition	to	the	pro-
ject	(in	mid-January	there	were	demonstrations	in	20	cities	across	the	country),	
were	the	key	reasons	for	the	sudden	U-turn	in	the	government’s	position	on	
shale	gas.	Prime	Minister	Boyko	Borisov	stated	that	he	would	not	press	ahead	
with	the	prospecting	and	extraction	plans	against	the	will	of	the	people,	while	
the	ruling	GERB	party	ensured	a	speedy	adoption	of	a	complete	ban	on	the	use	
of	hydraulic	fracturing.	The	sudden	shift	in	policy	came	as	a	big	surprise.	Mr	
Borisov,	however,	is	known	for	his	tendency	to	change	tack	on	controversial	
issues,	making	sure	that	he	is	seen	as	a	leader	willing	to	listen	to	his	people.	
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The	speedy	manner	in	which	the	ban	was	introduced	led	to	speculations	that	
both	the	environmental	groups	and	the	entire	campaign	had	been	supported	by	
‘hidden	external	actors’.	These	kinds	of	accusations	have	been	coming	mainly	
from	Traicho	Traikov,	the	Energy	Minister	in	the	GERB	government,	who	has	
suggested	that	the	campaign	launched	by	the	opponents	to	the	shale	gas	pro-
ject	 in	Bulgaria	had	been	coordinated	by	a	 foreign	PR	company.	Meanwhile,	
suggestions	that	the	opponents	to	the	project	were	acting	in	the	interest	of	the	
Russian	state	have	been	made	by	the	Blue	Coalition	–	the	only	political	party	to	
vote	against	the	ban	on	fracking.	The	party,	nonetheless,	remains	completely	
isolated	in	its	support	for	shale	gas	production	in	Bulgaria	since	there	is	now	
general	consensus	on	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum	that	the	ban	on	the	
prospecting	and	extraction	of	shale	gas	in	the	country	should	remain	in	place.	
4. Outlook 
Public	debate	on	shale	gas	production	in	Bulgaria	has	become	far	less	heated	
after	the	introduction	of	a	parliamentary	ban	on	the	use	of	hydraulic	fractur-
ing	and	is	now	no	longer	centred	on	the	justification	of	the	ban	but	rather	on	
ensuring	its	effectiveness.	The	overwhelming	majority	of	the	political	actors	
in	 the	 country	 remain	adamant	 in	 their	 opposition	 to	 the	 shale	gas	project.	
When	Bulgaria’s	new	Energy	Minister	Delian	Dobrev	(who	replaced	Traikov	
in	March	2012	after	his	dismissal)	announced	that	the	ban	on	fracking	needed	
to	be	amended,	he	stressed	that	the	changes	would	not	pave	the	way	for	shale	
gas	extraction.	Nonetheless,	opponents	of	shale	gas	accused	the	government	of	
trying	to	abandon	the	new	restrictions	and	warned	of	new	protests.	The	Civil	
Initiative	set	up	by	those	opposed	to	fracking	also	continues	to	call	for	the	in-
troduction	of	the	ban	on	the	prospecting	and	extraction	of	shale	gas	into	Bul-
garia’s	geological	and	mining	legislation.	It	therefore	follows	that	the	current	
debate	about	shale	gas	 in	Bulgaria	does	not	revolve	around	whether	the	ban	
should	have	been	introduced	but	rather	whether	the	present	regulations	offer	
sufficient	guarantees	that	no	further	prospecting	and	extraction	of	shale	gas	
will	be	attempted.	This would therefore suggest that, at least in the me-
dium term, there is no real chance that Bulgaria will lift its ban on the 
prospecting and extraction of shale gas. 
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II. THE CZECH REPUBLIC
1. Production potential, legal conditions  
and progress in prospecting 
A	 report	 issued	 by	 the	US	 Energy	 Information	Administration	 in	 June	 2011	
mentions	the	presence	of	shale	gas	deposits	in	the	Czech	Republic,	but	does	not	
specify	how	large	they	are.	The	Czech	Gas	Union	(a	union	of	local	gas	compa-
nies),	which	supports	shale	gas	production	in	the	country,	has	estimated	that	
the	production	levels	could	meet	5%-10%	of	annual	domestic	gas	consumption	
(400-800	mln	m3),	but	did	not	mention	the	estimated	size	of	the	deposits.	Local	
environmentalists,	who	have	been	opposition	the	project,	claim	that	shale	gas	
deposits	in	the	country	are	much	smaller	(neither	side	however	has	been	able	
to	provide	verifiable	evidence	for	their	estimates).
The	 general	 opinion	 in	 the	 Czech	Republic	 is	 that	 any	 future	 production	 of	
shale	gas	in	the	country	would	have	a	negligible	effect	on	the	overall	energy	
balance.	This	opinion	is	also	held	by	the	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Trade,	which	
has	excluded	domestic	deposits	of	shale	gas	from	its	energy	strategy,	which	is	
currently	being	updated.	
Currently,	over	90%	of	natural	gas,	which	accounts	for	about	20%	of	the	coun-
try’s	energy	balance,	is	imported.	Almost	two	thirds	of	the	gas	comes	from	Rus-
sia,	while	rest	is	supplied	by	Norway	under	a	bilateral	contract	or	purchased	at	
the	German	gas	exchange.	
In	 the	 spring	 of	 2011,	 Cuadrilla	 Morava	 (owned	 by	 Britain’s	 Cuadrilla	 Re-
sources	Limited)	and	BasGas	Energia	 (owned	by	Australia’s	Hutton	Energy)	
applied	to	the	Czech	Environment	Ministry	for	shale	gas	exploration	licences	
for	three	sites	selected	by	the	companies.	At	the	end	of	2011,	BasGas	Energia	
was	granted	a	five-year	licence	to	prospect	for	shale	gas	outside	the	towns	of	
Trutnov,	Broumov	and	Nachod,	 located	near	 the	Polish	border,	while	Cuad-
rilla	Morava	was	given	the	green	light	to	start	its	operations	in	the	vicinity	
of	Hranice,	Koprivnice	and	Valasske	Mezirici	in	eastern	Moravia.	The	third	
licence	applied	for	by	BasGas	Energia,	which	included	potential	deposits	near	
Cesky	Kras	and	 the	 town	of	Beroun,	around	30	km	outside	Prague,	has	not	
yet	been	processed	for	procedural	reasons.	Analyses	conducted	by	the	Czech	
Geological	 Institute	suggest	 that	shale	gas	deposits	might	also	be	 located	 in	
southern	Moravia,	near	Hodonin	and	Breclav,	as	well	as	in	the	Carpathians	in	
the	vicinity	of	the	Slovak	border.	
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The	decision	to	award	the	licences	without	consultation	with	local	government	
led	 to	 a	 series	 of	 objections	 from	 local	 authorities.	 The	 subsequent	 appeals	
stalled	prospecting	 activities	 in	 both	 areas	 covered	by	 the	 licences.	Opposi-
tion	from	local	environmentalists	and	the	residents	of	Trutnov	and	Nachod	led	
Environment	Minister	Tomas	Chalupa	to	cancel	the	licence	in	April	2012	and	
ordered	a	review	of	the	application.	BasGas’	resubmitted	application,	which	is	
currently	being	processed	by	the	Ministry,	no	longer	refers	to	the	region’s	most	
important	environmental	areas.	In	August	2012,	the	Czech	Environment	Min-
istry	annulled	also	the	licence	for	operations	in	eastern	Moravia	and	ordered	
a	review	of	the	application.	
In	addition	 to	 foreign	companies,	 the	potential	 for	 local	 shale	gas	produc-
tion	has	also	attracted	the	attention	of	Czech	energy	firms.	Among	them	is	
MND,	owned	by	billionaire	Karel	Komarek,	which	has	worked	with	several	
companies	exploring	shale	gas	deposits	in	Poland.	It	has	been	reported	that	
MND	is	seeking	a	partner	interested	in	starting	exploratory	shale	gas	drill-
ing	on	MND’s	conventional	gas	deposits	in	southern	Moravia,	near	the	Aus-
trian	border.	
2. The shale gas debate. Social and political reactions;  
legal consequences
The	 controversial	 plans	 for	 shale	 gas	 production	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 are	
not	 seen	 as	 a	 topic	 of	national	 importance;	 the	project	has	however	 caused	
a	heated	debate	 in	 the	regions	affected	by	 the	plans.	The	debate	gained	 im-
petus	in	March	2012,	after	the	first	public	protests	were	organised	by	shale	
gas	opponents,	leading	to	greater	media	interest	in	the	issue.	The	discussion	
continues	to	be	directed	by	local	environmentalists,	who	have	been	calling	for	
a	nationwide	ban	on	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing.	The	activists	(known	as	
the	STOP	HF	coalition)	have	been	cooperating	with	members	of	local	govern-
ment,	supported	by	national	politicians	who	originally	come	from	the	affected	
regions.	Their	opposition	meanwhile	 is	made	up	of	 the	companies	awarded	
the	production	licences	and	sporadic	support	for	the	project	from	representa-
tives	of	the	gas	industry.	The	local	elections,	combined	with	the	elections	to	
the	Senate	 (1/3	 of	 the	 seats)	 scheduled	 for	October	 2012,	politicise	 the	 issue	
and	mobilise	local	councils.	Interestingly,	the	views	on	shale	gas	in	the	Czech	
Republic	do	not	appear	 to	 follow	party	 lines:	 opposition	 to	prospecting	and	
extraction	activities	has	been	voiced	by	representatives	of	both	the	ruling	and	
the	opposition	parties	in	the	affected	areas	–	not	a	single	local	politician	has	
openly	supported	the	drilling.	
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The	government	in	Prague	waited	months	before	joining	the	debate	and	was	
therefore	portrayed	by	environmental	activists	as	a	supporter	of	shale	gas	pro-
duction.	However,	the	situation	changed	in	April	2012.	The	decision	taken	by	
the	Environment	Minister	to	annul	the	licences	and	to	order	a	review	of	the	
applications,	 coupled	with	plans	 for	a	moratorium	on	shale	gas	prospecting,	
puts	 the	Minister	 in	 an	uncomfortable	position	between	 the	opponents	 and	
the	supporters	of	the	project.	Meanwhile,	representatives	of	the	Industry	and	
Trade	Ministry,	who	have	been	more	favourably	disposed	towards	permitting	
shale	gas	extraction	in	the	country,	have	been	far	less	engaged	in	the	on-going	
debate.	Prime	Minister	Petr	Necas	has	not	yet	made	any	public	comment	on	the	
production	of	shale	gas	in	the	Czech	Republic.	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	current	public	debate	about	the	potential	environ-
mental	impact	of	hydraulic	fracturing	follows	a	long	series	of	environmental	
debates	that	feature	regularly	in	the	Czech	media.	Public	opinion	on	environ-
mental	matters	has	been	strongly	shaped	by	the	environmental	effects	of	over	
forty	years	of	unchecked	exploitation	of	mineral	resources	under	communism.	
The	value	of	public	contracts	available	to	companies	interested	in	dealing	with	
the	consequences	of	the	lasting	environmental	damage	has	been	estimated	at	
2.3	 billion	 euros.	 Environmental	 issues	 are	 particularly	 important	 in	 places	
such	as	Ostrava,	which	is	believed	to	have	some	of	Europe’s	highest	levels	of	air	
pollution,	or	north-western	parts	of	the	country,	devastated	by	local	opencast	
lignite	mines.	MPs	representing	these	regions	(regardless	of	political	affilia-
tion)	have	been	highlighting	 the	 importance	of	 environmental	 issues	 in	po-
litical	debate.	The	high	 levels	of	 interest	 in	environmental	 issues	among	the	
Czechs	is	also	evident	in	the	political	success	of	the	Green	Party,	which	formed	
part	of	the	ruling	coalition	between	2006	and	2010	(and	held	four	portfolios).	
Its	popularity	continues	to	oscillate	around	the	5%	election	threshold.	
Czech	society	is	also	characterised	by	high	levels	of	activity	among	non-govern-
mental	 environmental	 organisations,	whose	 actions	 are	 regularly	 discussed	 in	
national	debates.	Their	actions	address	both	purely	environmental	issues	(e.g.	the	
felling	of	bark	beetle	hit	trees	in	the	Sumava	National	Park),	as	well	as	broader	is-
sues,	such	as	the	construction	of	new	reactors	at	the	Temelin	nuclear	power	plant	
or	elements	of	the	missile	shield	(i.e.	a	planned	radar	facility	at	the	Brdy	military	
training	range).	Some	of	the	organisations,	particularly	those	opposing	the	use	of	
nuclear	power,	receive	funds	from	Austrian	donors	(including	the	Austrian	state).	
Czech	supporters	of	shale	gas	prospecting	argue	that	local	deposits	would	not	
only	improve	the	country’s	energy	security	but	also	stimulate	economic	growth	
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in	the	affected	regions.	A	Czech	Geological	Survey	(CGS)	report,	commissioned	
in	June	2011	by	the	Environment	Ministry,	recommended	that	prospecting	ac-
tivities	at	the	most	promising	sites	be	started.	According	to	CGS,	shale	gas	is	an	
important	domestic	source	of	eco-friendly	energy	and	the	environmental	risks	
associated	with	its	production	can	be	deemed	acceptable	if	the	production	pro-
cess	is	carefully	managed.	The	project	has	also	been	backed	by	the	head	of	the	
Czech	Gas	Union,	who	argues	that	the	financial	viability	of	domestic	shale	gas	
production	can	only	be	determined	by	a	series	of	exploratory	drills.	He	there-
fore	believes	that	it	is	ill-advised	of	the	government	to	block	the	work	of	those	
companies	which	 are	willing	 to	 explore	 the	 deposits	 at	 their	 own	 expense.	
A	similar	position	has	been	taken	by	the	Ministry	of	Industry	and	Trade.
The	supporters	of	the	shale	gas	prospecting	have	also	argued	that	experience	
in	other	countries	shows	that	hydraulic	fracturing	does	not	pose	any	risk	to	the	
environment.	Czech	MPs,	however,	are	not	convinced	by	these	statements,	and	
not	a	single	one	of	them	has	openly	supported	plans	for	shale	gas	prospecting.	
Very	few	Czech	politicians	have	backed	the	construction	of	exploratory	wells,	
including:	two	ODS	MEPs	Hynek	Fajmon	and	Oldrich	Vlasak.	Support	for	shale	
gas	exploration	has	also	been	coming	from	sources	close	to	President	Vaclav	
Klaus,	 including	 the	Centre	 for	Economics	and	Politics	 (CEP)	–	 a	 think	 tank	
established	by	the	president.	
Environment	Minister	 Tomas	 Chalupa	 has	 also	 endorsed	 exploratory	 drill-
ing	in	the	Czech	Republic.	In	his	opinion,	however,	prior	to	any	work	starting,	
the	government	needs	to	amend	key	legislation	to	create	an	appropriate	legal	
framework	for	the	project.	In	September	2012,	the	Chalupa	proposed	a	mora-
torium	on	shale	gas	prospecting	which,	if	passed,	would	remain	in	place	un-
til	June	2014.	During	this	period,	the	Czech	government	would	clearly	define	
the	rights	and	responsibilities	of	the	licence	holder	and	local	government,	and	
would	adopt	solutions	preventing	any	drilling	activity	 in	 the	country’s	most	
important	natural	areas.	The	new	prospecting	regulations,	expected	to	come	
into	effect	at	the	end	of	the	moratorium,	would	contain	a	series	of	restrictions.	
The	 Environment	Ministry	would	 only	 award	 prospecting	 licences	 to	 those	
companies	which	are	able	to	guarantee	that	their	technology	would	not	affect	
underground	water	flows	and	would	not	require	the	drilling	of	a	large	number	
of	wells.	If	it	transpires	that	the	new	stipulations	cannot	be	met,	the	Ministry	
is	prepared	to	delay	further	prospecting	work	until	new	technologies	become	
available.	It	remains	unclear	whether	the	moratorium	would	be	binding	also	
for	these	companies	which	have	already	been	awarded	prospecting	licences,	or	
whether	it	would	affect	only	new	permits.	
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After	several	months	of	objections	against	the	use	of	fracking,	first	raised	in	
March	2012	by	local	government	officials	and	environmental	activists	in	the	
affected	areas,	the	protest	was	moved	to	Prague.	On	14	June,	a	draft	bill	propos-
ing	to	ban	all	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	in	the	Czech	Republic	passed	its	first	
reading	in	the	Senate	with	just	one	objection	–	from	Senator	Stanislav	Juranek	
(KDU-CSL).	The	bill	was	penned	by	Senators	Petr	Pakosta	 from	Nachod	 (in-
dependent),	Jiri	Oberfalzer	from	Beroun	(ODS)	and	Pavel	Trpak	from	Trutnov	
(CSSD)	together	with	the	leaders	of	the	STOP	HF	coalition.	It	is	worth	noting,	
however,	that	due	to	lack	of	interest	among	the	senators,	the	vote	was	not	pre-
ceded	by	any	debate.	In	May,	a	draft	of	a	similar	bill	was	announced	by	the	gov-
ernors	(hejtmans)	from	all	Czech	regions,	led	by	Michal	Hasek,	the	head	of	the	
South	Moravian	Region,	an	MP,	and	the	deputy	chair	of	the	opposition	Czech	
Social	Democratic	Party	(CSSD).	Unlike	the	bill	drafted	in	the	upper	house,	this	
proposal	is	clearly	an	anti-government	party	initiative.	The	plan	to	submit	the	
draft	for	debate	in	the	lower	house	can	therefore	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	po-
liticise	the	shale	gas	issue	by	the	opposition	CSSD.	
Surprisingly	perhaps,	local	energy	business	representatives	have	been	rather	
reluctant	to	join	the	public	debate	on	shale	gas.	In	response	to	public	support	
for	the	project	from	the	head	of	the	Czech	Gas	Union,	the	debate	was	joined	by	
Hugo	Kysilka	–	the	marketing	director	of	gas	importer	Vemex	(which	has	links	
to	Russia’s	Gazprom).	Kysilka	cited	concerns	about	the	potential	environmen-
tal	impact	of	hydraulic	fracturing	and	stressed	that	since	the	expected	size	of	
the	deposits	is	quite	small,	domestic	shale	gas	production	would	not	allow	the	
country	 to	end	 its	 reliance	on	 foreign	gas	 supplies.	He	also	 reminded	Czech	
politicians	 about	 the	 plans	 to	 construct	 new	 pipelines	 which	 are	 to	 supply	
more	gas	from	the	East.	The	low	estimates	of	the	amount	of	shale	gas	available	
in	the	Czech	Republic	might	also	be	the	reason	why	the	heads	of	the	country’s	
major	energy	companies	have	so	 far	 failed	 to	comment	on	the	 issue.	For	 the	
same	reason,	plans	 for	domestic	 shale	gas	production	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	
have	not	featured	in	discussions	between	Prague,	Moscow	and	Washington.	
The	 limited	 interest	 in	 the	 domestic	 shale	 gas	 deposits	 have	 not	 however	
stopped	the	Czechs	from	analysing	the	impact	unconventional	gas	deposits	in	
other	countries	are	having	on	the	European	energy	market.	Some	economists	
have	suggested	that	large-scale	production	of	shale	gas	across	Europe	could	pre-
cipitate	a	drop	in	the	share	value	of	the	state	energy	giant	CEZ.	Large	amounts	
of	cheap	gas	in	Europe	would	also	raise	questions	about	the	financial	viability	
of	the	plan	to	construct	two	new	reactors	at	the	Temelin	nuclear	power	plant,	
since	investors	might	be	more	interested	in	putting	their	money	into	gas-fired	
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power	stations.	None	of	this,	however,	can	be	controlled	by	the	government	in	
Prague.	There	are	also	many	signals	suggesting	that	Prague	might	support	the	
development	of	shale	gas	production	in	Poland,	since	this	would	facilitate	its	
access	to	cheap	gas	without	the	need	to	pay	the	social	and	environmental	costs	
of	the	project.	
3. Outlook 
It	is	rather	unlikely	that	the	Czech	parliament	will	approve	a	complete	ban	on	
the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing;	a	more	probable	scenario	is	that	MPs	will	pass	
the	moratorium	on	shale	gas	prospecting	drafted	by	the	Environment	Minis-
try.	The	government	in	Prague	has	been	very	cautious	about	how	it	deals	with	
the	issue,	trying	very	hard	to	find	the	golden	mean.	On	the	one	hand,	the	gov-
ernment	agrees	with	the	opponents	of	fracking,	ruling	out	the	possibility	of	
allowing	exploratory	wells	to	be	drilled	in	areas	of	outstanding	natural	beauty.	
On	the	other	hand,	it	appears	to	accept	the	arguments	proposed	by	the	Czech	
Geological	Survey,	which	favour	the	use	of	exploratory	drills	to	estimate	the	
size	of	the	available	deposits.	At	the	same	time,	the	minister	has	been	keen	to	
stress	that	there	is	no	need	to	rush,	since	the	deposits	would	not	disappear,	and	
the	introduction	of	a	moratorium	would	not	decrease	the	potential	for	future	
profit.	It	is	reasonable	to	assume,	therefore,	that	one of the objectives of this 
strategy is to wait and see how the shale gas issue is dealt with in Poland.	
Under	the	Environment	Minister’s	proposals,	Parliament	would	use	the	time	
offered	by	the	moratorium	to	adopt	amendments	to	the	law	on	geological	works,	
mining	law	and	the	environmental	impact	assessment	regulations.	The	doubts	
about	 shale	gas	go	hand	 in	hand	with	 the	highly	controversial	debate	about	
the	so-called	territorial	limits	for	lignite	mining	in	the	northwest	of	the	coun-
try.	Under	pressure	from	a	strong	coalition	of	MPs	coming	from	the	affected	
regions	(particularly	Milan	Stovicek),	 the	government	 is	planning	to	amend	
mining	law	to	prevent	land	expropriation	for	mining	development.	The	pass-
ing	of	such	changes	would	significantly	restrict	the	development	of	any	new	
deposits,	including	shale	gas	deposits.	
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APPENDIX 
The situation in the individual areas of the Czech Republic which are 
likely to hold shale gas deposits
•	 Trutnov 
The	 most	 serious	 protests	 against	 the	 use	 of	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 took	
place	at	the	Trutnov	field	located	near	the	Polish	border,	which	was	awarded	
to	BasGas.	Members	of	local	government	raised	objections	to	prospecting	ac-
tivities	mainly	due	to	 fears	 that	 the	 technology	could	pollute	underground	
sources	 of	 natural	 mineral	 water,	 coupled	 with	 the	 negative	 experiences	
of	the	local	population	linked	to	the	environmental	damage	caused	by	years	
of	coal	mining	in	the	area.	Local	politicians	stressed	that	until	now	the	En-
vironment	Ministry	blocked	or	restricted	all	kinds	of	construction	or	infra-
structural	 projects	 in	 the	 area,	 citing	 environmental	 concerns.	 Therefore,	
when	 the	 central	 government	 issued	a	permit	 for	 shale	gas	prospecting	 in	
the	 region,	without	any	consultation	with	 local	 councils,	 the	 residents	 felt	
unable	to	accept	the	decision.	Hoping	to	receive	additional	backing	in	its	fight	
against	the	project,	Nachod	Town	Council	sought	allies	across	the	border	in	
Poland’s	Kudowa-Zdroj.	
Protests	 across	 the	 Trutnov	 site	 were	 led	 by	 Lubomir	 Franc,	 the	 governor	
(hejtman)	of	Hradec	Kralove	region	representing	CSSD,	which	is	linked	to	his	
re-election	ambitions	in	the	October	polls..	On	6	March,	the	governor	invited	
representatives	 of	 regional	 government	 to	 come	 to	Nachod	where	 they	held	
a	meeting	with	delegates	from	the	Environment	Ministry	and	the	energy	com-
pany	BasGas.	During	the	meeting	the	local	government	officials	signed	the	‘Na-
chod	Declaration’	in	which	they	officially	voiced	their	objection	to	the	use	of	
hydraulic	fracturing	in	the	region	and	offered	full	cooperation	at	every	stage	
of	 the	process.	The	 local	 councils	 then	appealed	 the	decision	 to	 issue	 the	 li-
cence,	forcing	BasGas	to	suspend	all	work	at	the	sites.	Without	a	doubt,	the	ac-
tions	taken	by	the	councillors	from	Trutnov	and	the	surrounding	areas	influ-
enced	the	Environment	Ministry’s	decision	taken	in	April	to	annul	the	licence	
and	review	BasGas’s	application	again.	
The	Trutnov	area	is	also	home	to	a	number	of	environmental	groups,	which	
subsequently	established	 the	STOP	HF	coalition	 led	by	 Jiri	Malik	–	 the	head	
of	 the	Living	Water	 association.	The	 coalition,	which	 currently	unites	 envi-
ronmentalists	from	across	the	country	and	several	local	authorities,	calls	for	
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a	statutory	ban	on	hydraulic	fracturing	in	the	Czech	Republic,	claiming	that	
the	technology	leads	to	the	pollution	of	underground	water.	Malik	has	attract-
ed	much	attention	from	both	the	local	and	national	media.	
A	separate	group	of	people	opposing	shale	gas	prospecting	and	extraction	in	
areas	of	outstanding	natural	beauty	has	been	formed	by	several	national	park	
authorities	located	in	the	affected	areas.	Their	demands	have	also	won	the	sup-
port	of	the	Krkonose	National	Park	authorities,	which	borders	on	the	Trutnov	
site,	as	well	as	a	number	of	experts	from	the	Czech	Geological	Survey.	
•	 Eastern Moravia
In	contrast	to	the	strong	and	united	opposition	voiced	in	the	regions	surround-
ing	Trutnov,	local	councils	in	the	vicinity	of	Moravia’s	Valasske	Mezirici	unan-
imously	supported	shale	gas	prospecting	in	the	region.	Cuadrilla	Morava	was	
even	welcomed	by	local	environmental	groups,	which	stressed	only	that	the	
exploratory	wells	could	not	be	drilled	 in	 the	Beskydy	National	Park.	The	at-
titude	of	 the	 local	councillors	and	the	region’s	residents,	however,	gradually	
changed	over	 time.	This	was	 caused	not	only	by	unfavourable	media	 cover-
age	of	 the	project	but	also	due	 to	a	 report	produced	by	 the	Czech	Geological	
Survey	 commissioned	 by	 the	 Environment	 Industry.	 The	 report	 concluded	
that	the	Moravian	Wallachia	(Czech:	Valassko)	was	too	valuable	and	sensitive	
to	human	interference	 to	allow	exploratory	drilling	 to	go	ahead	 in	 the	area.	
Consequently,	local	councillors	decided	to	offer	their	support	to	the	STOP	HF	
coalition	and	raised	their	concerns	using	the	Environment	Ministry’s	appeal	
procedure,	which	effectively	blocked	 the	 implementation	of	 the	prospecting	
licence.	In	August	2012	the	Ministry	annulled	the	original	licence	and	ordered	
a	review	of	Cuadrilla	Morava’s	application.	
•	 Beroun
BasGas	Energia	also	applied	for	a	licence	to	begin	prospecting	for	shale	gas	in	
an	area	near	Cesky	Kras	and	the	town	of	Beroun,	around	30	km	west	of	Prague.	
Although	the	application	has	not	yet	been	processed	 for	procedural	reasons,	
groups	of	environmentalists	and	 local	residents	have	come	together	 to	voice	
their	 opposition	 against	 the	project.	 The	movement	 (linked	 to	 the	 STOP	HF	
coalition)	has	been	led	by	Beroun	councillor	Sarka	Endrlova,	who	has	since	es-
tablished	links	with	councillors	in	neighbouring	communities.	Local	govern-
ment	benefits	from	the	significant	media	coverage	since	its	actions	have	been	
backed	by	the	managers	of	the	popular	Cesky	Kras	National	Park.	
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III. ROMANIA 
1. Production potential – deposits and corporate interest in shale gas 
At	present	the	only	available	data	on	the	scale	of	shale	gas	deposits	in	Romania	
are	rough	estimates	compiled	by	the	US	Energy	Information	Administration	
(EIA).	The	EIA	has	reported	combined	estimates	for	three	countries:	Hungary,	
Romania	 and	Bulgaria,	which	 suggest	 that	 the	 so-called	 Carpathian-Balkan	
basin	 could	potentially	 contain	 538	bcm	of	 shale	 gas	 (separate	 estimates	 for	
Romania	are	currently	unavailable).	It	should	however	be	noted	that	in	Febru-
ary	2012	the	Romanian	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Forests	reported	that	in	
2011	it	had	conducted	initial	tests	to	estimate	the	size	of	the	country’s	shale	gas	
deposits,	although	no	further	details	have	been	made	available.	The	tests	were	
allegedly	carried	out	by	the	National	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources	in	coopera-
tion	with	the	national	research	institute	GeoEcoMar	and	three	universities	(in	
Bucharest,	Iasi	and	Cluj).	
Romania	has	managed	to	attract	more	interest	from	companies	seeking	to	se-
cure	shale	gas	prospecting	licences	than	both	Bulgaria	and	the	Czech	Republic.	
To	date,	over a dozen firms have expressed an interest in starting pros-
pecting and extraction operations in Romania.	Among	the	major	players	
entering	the	Romanian	shale	gas	market	are:	US	energy	giant	Chevron	(which	
has	been	awarded	four	prospecting	licences,	three	in	Dobruja	and	one	in	the	
Moldova	region);	and	Romania’s	Romgaz,	which	confirmed	 in	 June	2012	 that	
it	first	used	hydraulic	fracturing	back	in	the	mid	90s,	adding	that	at	the	time	
the	company	found	that	five	of	 its	twenty	exploratory	wells	 in	Transylvania	
contained	shale	gas.	The	Romanian	energy	market	is	populated	by	a	number	
of	other	 companies,	usually	holding	 just	 a	 single	 licence	 for	oil	prospecting;	
they	have	however	expressed	equal	interest	in	searching	for	local	deposits	of	
shale	gas.	Among	them	are	Hungary’s	MOL,	Canada’s	East	West	Petroleum	and	
Media	Resources	 (for	more	 information	about	 the	awarded	 licences,	 see	Ap-
pendix).	To	date,	none	of	the	companies	has	been	able	to	fully	confirm	the	pres-
ence	of	shale	gas	deposits	in	the	country.	The	only	optimistic	news	has	been	
reported	by	Britain’s	Sterling	Resources,	which	stated	at	the	end	of	2011	that	it	
was	50%	certain	that	its	field	contained	42	bcm	of	shale	gas.	
A	discovery	of	shale	gas	and	its	subsequent	extraction	at	an	industrial	scale	
would	secure	the	dominance	of	gas	 in	Romania’s	energy	balance.	Natural	
gas	 is	 the	country’s	most	 important	energy	resource	 (it	accounts	 for	over	
30%	of	all	energy	resources	used	in	Romania).	Importantly,	over	80%	of	the	
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country’s	gas	consumption	comes	from	local	deposits,	while	the	remaining	
part	is	imported	from	Russia.	
2. Legal regulations
Romania	does	not	currently	have	special	legislation	regulating	the	prospecting	
and	production	of	shale	gas.	Companies	 interested	 in	 launching	prospecting	
activities	 in	 the	country	need	to	apply	 for	a	regular	 licence	 for	hydrocarbon	
exploration.	As	a	general	rule,	any	company	holding	a	hydrocarbon	licence	in	
Romania	may	operate	exploration	works	for	unconventional	resources.	Never-
theless,	according	to	the	Environment	Ministry,	Romania	lacks	specific	proce-
dures	used	to	assess	the	environmental	impact	of	shale	gas	drilling.	
When	coming	to	power	in	May	2012,	Victor	Ponta’s	government	included	 ‘an	
immediate	establishment	of	a	moratorium	on	shale	gas	operation	to	complete	
studies	that	are	ongoing	at	the	European	level	on	the	environmental	impacts	
of	the	hydraulic	fracturing	process’	in	its	manifesto	plans.	So	far,	however,	no	
relevant	 legislation	has	been	adopted	to	 facilitate	such	a	moratorium.	None-
theless,	the	prime	minister	claims	that	the	moratorium	is	effectively	in	opera-
tion	and	will	remain	in	place	until	December	2012.	After	that	–	following	the	
December	parliamentary	election	–	the	government	is	to	decide	whether	or	not	
to	extend	the	moratorium.	It	should	therefore	be	understood	that	Romania	has	
introduced	a	 ‘political’	moratorium	on	shale	gas	prospecting	and	extraction,	
which	has	never	been	officially	legislated.	
3. Shale gas in public debate and local politics
Shale	gas	became	a	topic	of	nationwide	debate	after	Mihai	Razvan	Ungureanu’s	
centre-right	government	awarded	three	licences	to	US	energy	giant	Chevron	
in	March	2012.	The	decision	caused	local	protests	on	a	limited	scale.	The	larg-
est	demonstration	was	held	in	the	town	of	Barlad	(where	the	US	company	had	
been	operating	since	2010),	where	5,000	people	took	to	the	streets	to	show	their	
opposition	 to	 gas	 prospecting.	The	demonstrations	were	 coordinated	by	 the	
Association	of	Barlad	Residents,	led	by	an	MP	from	the	then	ruling	Democratic	
Liberal	Party.	The	protests	in	other	towns,	however,	were	not	led	by	a	particu-
lar	party	and	tended	to	be	poorly	organised.	The	issue	of	shale	gas	came	to	the	
attention	of	local	environmentalists	even	before	Chevron	received	its	licences.	
In	February	2012,	one	of	the	key	organisations	uniting	environmental	organi-
sations	penned	a	letter	addressed	to	the	Environment	Ministry,	demanding	an	
explanation	of	the	country’s	policy	on	shale	gas	prospecting	and	production,	
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stressing	that	the	technology	used	in	the	process	was	harmful	to	the	environ-
ment.	 The	 activity	 of	 Romanian	 environmental	 groups	 however	was	 rather	
negligible,	particularly	when	compared	with	the	public	outcry	in	neighbour-
ing	Bulgaria.	
The	decision	to	award	the	licences	to	Chevron	attracted	a	lot	of	criticism	from	
the	then	opposition	Social	Liberal	Union.	SLU	cited	Chevron’s	shale	gas	licences	
as	an	example	of	the	government’s	inability	to	run	the	country	and	then	used	
the	matter	as	a	formal	argument	in	its	justification	for	a	vote	of	no	confidence	
in	Ungureanu’s	government.	It	should	be	noted	that	SLU’s	protests	did	not	re-
fer	 to	 the	potential	extraction	of	shale	gas	but	rather	 to	 the	unclear	criteria	
used	to	award	the	licences.	As	could	be	expected,	the	government’s	subsequent	
decision	to	classify	all	information	about	the	process	proved	highly	controver-
sial.	Ungureanu’s	government	argued	that	the	move	was	necessary	to	protect	
trade	 secrets,	 even	 though	Chevron	 requested	 the	 government	 to	declassify	
the	main	terms	and	conditions	of	the	contract,	and	stressed	that	the	confiden-
tiality	clause	was	added	by	the	government	at	its	own	accord.	
The	issue	was	widely	reported	in	the	local	media	and	generated	great	interest	
from	the	opposition	centre-left	Social-Liberal	Union.	The	leader	of	the	largest	
party	within	SLU	–	Victor	Ponta	from	the	Social	Democratic	Party	–	accused	
the	government	of	secretly	selling	the	country’s	mineral	resources.	A	similar	
accusation	 came	 from	 the	 leader	 of	 the	National-Liberal	 Party	 (also	 an	SLU	
member)	Crin	Antonescu,	who	stressed	that	he	was	not protesting against 
shale gas production but against the procedures used to award the licenc-
es.	Shale	gas	was	therefore	associated	by	SLU	with	the	manner	in	which	the	
government	privatised	key	state	companies,	exemplified	by	the	sale	of	the	cop-
per	producer	Cupru	Min	or	the	controversial	Rosia	Montana	gold	mine.	Soon	
after,	shale	gas	became	associated	with	the	conflict	surrounding	the	construc-
tion	of	a	mine	in	Rosia	Montana,	which	Romanian	society	saw	as	an	example	of	
the	government’s	desire	to	maximise	the	state’s	profit	by	ignoring	the	interests	
of	local	communities	and	exposing	them	to	a	potential	environmental	disaster.	
In	Romania,	therefore,	shale	gas	appeared	as	an	element	of	a	wider	public	de-
bate	about	actions	taken	by	the	state	with	regard	to	the	excavation	of	mineral	
resources	and	its	relations	with	foreign	investors.	
One	of	the	supporters	of	shale	gas	production	has	been	Romania’s	right-wing	
president	Traian	Basescu,	who	is	an	outspoken	critic	of	the	central-left	SLU.	
The	president	regularly	stressed	that	the	extraction	of	shale	gas	in	Romania	
would	offer	the	country	an	opportunity	 to	reduce	 its	dependence	on	foreign	
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energy	supplies	and	cited	Poland	as	an	example	to	follow	with	regard	to	the	use	
of	shale	gas	as	a	way	to	improve	the	country’s	energy	security.	He	also	called	
for	a	quick	decision	on	the	future	of	shale	gas	extraction	 in	Romania	to	end	
uncertainty	among	investors.	The	president	also	highlighted	the	need	for	close	
cooperation	with	western	companies	and	called	for	a	review	of	the	system	used	
to	set	fees	for	the	exploitation	of	mineral	resources.	
The	use	of	mineral	resources	became	one	of	the	three	official	reasons	for	a	vote	
of	no	confidence	 in	Ungureanu’s	pro-presidential	government.	After	 the	no-
confidence	motion	was	passed,	power	in	the	country	was	handed	over	to	the	
centre-left	SLU	and	Victor	Ponta	was	asked	to	form	a	Cabinet.	One	of	the	first	
declarations	made	by	the	new	Cabinet	was	the	introduction	of	a	moratorium	
on	shale	gas	prospecting	and	extraction.	Since	coming	to	power,	however,	SLU	
has	not	made	any	changes	to	the	relevant	legislation.	Furthermore,	in	mid	June	
2012,	the	SLU-controlled	Senate	rejected	a	draft	bill	proposing	a	complete	ban	
on	the	use	of	hydraulic	fracturing	in	the	country.	The	bill	was	submitted	by	
a	group	of	SLU	MPs	before	 the	 formation	of	Victor	Ponta’s	government.	The	
recent	measures	therefore	suggest	that	SLU	politicians	have	abandoned	their	
earlier	plans	to	introduce	the	moratorium.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	Environ-
ment	Minister	in	the	SLU	Cabinet	has	reiterated	his	plans	to	introduce	a	two-
year	moratorium	on	shale	gas	prospecting	if	the	party	wins	the	next	election	
but	 it	 is	clear	 that	 the	debate	on	the	 issue	has	died	down.	At	present,	public	
debate	in	Romania	has	been	dominated	by	the	start	of	impeachment	proceed-
ings	against	president	Traian	Basescu,	initiated	by	SLU	in	early	July.	This	may	
suggest	that	the	issue	of	shale	gas	extraction	was	used	by	SLU	purely	instru-
mentally	to	fight	political	battles	with	Ungureanu’s	government.	
4. Outlook 
The	moderate	activity	of	Romanian	environmental	groups,	coupled	with	the	
lack	of	activity	among	Romanian	interest	groups	opposed	to	shale	gas	produc-
tion,	 effectively	means	 that	Romania’s position on shale gas will depend 
mainly on the way the political situation in the country unfolds, and par-
ticularly on how the political conflict between the government and presi-
dent plays out.	The	most	probable	scenario	is	a	continued	deadlock	between	
the	centre-right	president	and	the	 favourite	 in	 the	December	parliamentary	
election	 –	 the	 centre-left	 SLU.	 This	would	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 legal	
moratorium	 on	 shale	 gas,	 since	 SLU’s	 dislike	 for	 the	 president	would	 likely	
further	politicise	the	issue,	with	both	sides	opting	to	use	it	in	their	day-to-day	
political	battles.	Alternatively,	however,	the	on-going	political	conflict	could	be	
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won	by	either	SLU	or	President	Basescu.	SLU	currently	enjoys	the	support	of	
around	50%	of	the	electorate	and	is	seen	as	the	favourite	in	the	December	par-
liamentary	election.	By	forming	a	government	after	the	election,	SLU	could	try	
to	remove	the	president	from	power	(e.g.,	by	resuming	the	impeachment	pro-
ceedings).	However,	should	SLU	fail	to	do	particularly	well	in	the	election,	the	
president	might	try	to	form	a	new	government	by	forging	alliances	with	other	
parties.	This	would	be	further	facilitated	by	the	fact	that	the	president	has	at	
its	disposal	the	constitutional	prerogative	to	appoint	his	prime	minister.	Both	
scenario	–	the	consolidation	of	power	by	SLU,	and	the	formation	of	a	pro-pres-
idential	government	after	the	elections	–	offer	less	chance	of	a	moratorium.	
Further developments around the issue of shale gas in Romania could also 
be affected by the evolution of diplomatic relations between Bucharest 
and Washington. When	 SLU	 began	 impeachment	 proceedings	 against	 the	
pro-American	 Basescu,	 and	 following	 a	 subsequent	 referendum,	 the	United	
States	expressed	serious	concern	over	the	party’s	actions,	which	Washington	
described	as	in	violation	of	the	standards	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	US	reaction,	
seen	in	Romania	as	a	show	of	support	for	Basescu,	led	to	a	growing	distrust	of	
American	foreign	policy	among	both	the	ruling	party	and	parts	of	Romanian	
society.	And	since	shale	gas	projects	are	generally	associated	with	US	interests	
in	the	region,	the	issue	could	become	a	bargaining	tool	in	Bucharest’s	relations	
with	Washington.	It	should	be	stressed,	however,	that	the	issue	could	be	used	
both	as	an	anti-American	tool	(by	introducing	a	moratorium)	or	as	a	gesture	of	
good	will,	stressing	the	desire	to	maintaining	Bucharest’s	good	political	rela-
tions	with	Washington	(by	abandoning	the	plans	for	a	moratorium).
 Last update 25 September 2012
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TABLE. Shale gas companies awarded exploratory licences in Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic and Romania (updated August 2012) 
Company Site location Additional information  and progress
BULGARIA
Park	Place	Energy	
Corporation
A	prospecting	
licence	for	a	site	
in	Dobrich	region,	
Dobruja		
(north-western	
Bulgaria).	Blocks:	
Vranino	1	-	11	
The	licence	was	awarded	in	October	2010,	
and	confirmed	in	court	in	March	2012	
(following	an	appeal	by	another	bidder).	
Park	Place	Energy	specialises	in	prospec-
ting	for	shale	gas;	following	the	ban	on	
fracking,	the	company	has	vowed	to	abide	
by	the	new	restrictions.	
Transatlantic	Pe-
troleum	Ltd.	(via	
Direct	Petroleum)
A	prospecting	
licence	Lovech		
(north-eastern	
Bulgaria)
The	licence	was	awarded	to	Bulgaria’s	
Direct	Petroleum	back	in	2004.	In	2011,		
the	company	was	taken	over	by	US	Trans-
atlantic	Petroleum.	Initial	exploratory	te-
sts	at	the	site	confirm	the	presence	of	both	
shale	gas	and	conventional	gas	deposits	
in	the	area.	The	company	does	not	offer	
progress	reports	but	has	invited	bids	from	
companies	interested	in	prospecting	for	
conventional	gas	at	the	site.
Chevron	(licence	
agreement	rema-
ins	unsigned)
Novi	Pazar,	Dobruja	
(north-western	
Bulgaria)	
Chevron	was	awarded	preliminary	li-
cence	permit	in	June	2011,	but	in	January	
2012	Bulgarian	government	annulled	
the	outcome	of	the	bidding	process	and	
decided	not	to	sign	the	final	licence	
agreement.
CZECH REPUBLIC
BasGas	Energia Trutnov,	Broumov	
Nachod	–
Northern	parts	of	
the	Czech	Republic,	
near	the	Polish	
border.
The	licence	was	awarded	in	2011,	and	
then	annulled	in	April	2012	by	the	
Environment	Ministry	and	referred	for	
review.	The	company	then	resubmitted	
an	amended	application	for	a	smaller	site,	
without	areas	of	outstanding	national	
beauty.	
Cuadrilla	Morava Hranice,	Koprivni-
ce,	Valasske	Meziri-
ci	(Moravia)
The	licence	was	awarded	in	2011,	and	then	
annulled	in	August	2012	by	the	Environ-
ment	Ministry,	and	referred	for	review.	
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Company Site location Additional information  and progress
ROMANIA
Chevron Barlad,	north-
-eastern	Romania,	
near	the	Moldovan	
border.
Chevron	received	its	oil	and	gas	explora-
tion	licence	in	2010	from	Regal	Petroleum	
(originally	awarded	to	RP	in	2004).	Area	
6,257	km2,	Chevron	is	planning	three	
exploratory	wells	(ca.	3-4	km	deep).		
No	progress	reports	available.	
Chevron Adamclisi,	Costi-
nesti,	Vama	Veche,	
south-eastern	
Romania,	near	the	
Bulgarian	border.
The	licence	was	awarded	in	March	2012	
for	a	total	of	2,700	km2.	No	progress	re-
ports	available.
MOL	and	Expert	
Petroleum
(70%	/	30%)	
Voivozi	(Ex-1),		
Adea	(ex-5),	Curtici	
(EX-6)		
–	north-western	
Romania	
The	licence	was	awarded	in	April	2012	for	
a	total	of	3,434	km2.	MOL	has	indicated	
that	the	site	may	contain	unconventional	
gas	and	oil	deposits	and	plans	to	carry	
out	prospecting	activities.	No	progress	
reports	available.
East	West	Petro-
leum	(EWP)	toge-
ther	with	Naftna	
Industrija	Srbije	
(NIS)	–	85%/15%
Ex-2	(Tria),	Ex-3	
(Baile	Felix),	Ex-7	
(Periam),	Ex-8	
(Biled)		
–	North-western	
Romania
Each	licence	covers	around	1,000	km2.	
East	West	Petroleum	suggests	that	all	sites	
are	likely	to	contain	shale	gas	deposits.		
To	date,	however,	no	exploratory	work	has	
been	done.	
Media	Resources	
(controlled	by	
Sterling	Resour-
ces)	together	with	
Transatlantic	
Petroleum		
(each	holding	
a	50%	stake)
EIII-7,	Sud	Craio-
va	–	south-western	
Romania	(Oltenia)
The	licence	was	awarded	in	2000.	Agre-
ement	on	oil	and	gas	prospecting;	the	
companies	express	interest	in	prospecting	
for	unconventional	gas	deposits.
Zeta	Petroleum	
(50%)	and	Raffles	
Energy	Pte		
(50%,	operator	on	
the	deposit)
Climauti,	Suceava	
(Bukovina,	nor-
thern	Romania)
In	late	May	2012,	Zeta	Petroleum	pur-
chased	Regal	Petroleum	together	with	its	
exploration	and	production	licence.	Zeta	
Petroleum	announced	that	the	concession	
offers	both	conventional	gas	as	well	as	
unconventional	gas	potential.	
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Company Site location Additional information  and progress
Romgaz	 Romgaz	operates	
8	licences,	lack	of	
data	on	individual	
licences	in	Transy-
lvania	
In	June	2012,	Romgaz	representatives	
confirmed	that	tests	conducted	in	the	90s	
uncovered	shale	gas	deposits	in	5/20	wells	
in	Transylvania.	No	further	details	about	
the	exact	location	of	the	site	or	subsequent	
progress	are	available.	
Despite their initial interest in shale gas exploration, over the past year 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have become increasingly 
sceptical about the development of unconventional gas resources. 
In January of this year Bulgaria introduced an indefinite ban on the 
exploration and production of shale gas and Romania followed suit in May 
by introducing a six-month moratorium on exploration work, which it plans 
to extend by another six months following the country’s parliamentary 
elections scheduled for December. Similar measures are being planned by 
the government in Prague. The aim of this report is to explore the reasons 
why countries which claim to want to improve their energy security have 
been showing increasing scepticism towards shale gas. 
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